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1. A Brief History of Parliament’s Involvement
in the ‘Comitology’ System
The institutional position of the European Parliament with
regard to delegated rule-making is fundamentally
ambiguous. On the one hand, it is a legislator together with
the Council and thus claims to control the Commission in
the exercise of its implementing powers. On the other hand,
as a supranational institution, the Parliament shares aims
and interests which are closer to those of the Commission,
and thus has a more oppositional relationship with the
Council.
The comitology system was not provided for anywhere
in the Treaty.1 It emerged out of a practical need and for
pragmatic reasons. The establishment and management
of a common market requires the ability quickly to adopt
and amend specific technical regulations. The Council had
neither the necessary structure nor an appropriate
institutional character to do this itself, but did not want to
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delegate implementing decision-making powers without
retaining some sort of control. The Commission, on the
other hand, did not possess all the necessary information
and resources to keep abreast of developments and
requirements in the fields to be regulated. Comitology was
the perfect solution to satisfy both. The Council was not
responsible for details, but was still in control via these
‘mini-councils’ in the committees. The Commission acquired
the power to partly implement what it initially presents as a
proposal in the legislative process. With the introduction of
Article 202(3)2 by the Single European Act, these imple-
menting committees acquired an explicit legal basis in the
Treaty. This paragraph formed the legal base for the first
‘comitology’ decision3 adopted in 1987, and retrospectively
legitimised the existence of these committees by establishing
that the Council could impose certain requirements in
respect of the exercise of the Commission’s implementing
powers.
The current procedures governing the work of the
Some 300 legislative acts are adopted every year by the European Parliament and the
Council, or by the Council alone. Based on these acts, the European Commission adopts
around 3,000 implementing acts each year, after consulting one of the 250 so-called
‘Comitology committees’ made up of representatives of the Member States. Only about
0.2% of these delegated acts are referred back to the Council because of non-agreement
between the Commission and the Committee. Since the entry into force of the second
Comitology decision in 1999, Parliament also has a right of scrutiny over such acts, but
it has used this right in order to question the Commission’s proposals in only three cases.
This paper asks whether this right of scrutiny is an appropriate  way of controlling delegated
rule-making. It starts with a short historical overview of Parliament’s role, before describing
the current legal regulation of Parliament’s involvement in comitology procedures. It then
looks in detail at the three cases in which Parliament has to date adopted a ‘Resolution’.
Finally, a general assessment is made of parliamentarian control over implementing
powers, with a view to contributing to the present discussion about an adequate system of
delegated rule-making under the Constitutional Treaty.
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committees are laid down in the second Comitology Decision
- Council Decision 1999/468.4 Under the advisory
procedure, the Commission must take utmost account of
the views of the committee. Under the management
procedure, the committee, acting by qualified majority,
gives an opinion; unless there is a negative opinion, the
Commission may adopt the act. Under the regulatory
procedure, the committee, acting by qualified majority,
gives an opinion; the Commission may only adopt the act
if there is a positive opinion.
The Parliament did not fundamentally oppose the emer-
gence of the comitology system. In a Resolution of 1968 it
recognised the additional value that these committees
would give to the executive decision-making process.5
However, from the beginning the Parliament demanded
that the committee procedures should not endanger the
institutional balance of the Community, and should have a
mere advisory role.6
The Parliament did express concerns regarding the lack
of transparency of those committees and the impossibility
of carrying out democratic supervision. These complaints
failed to be heeded by the Commission, however, until
Parliament exercised its budgetary powers and refused to
release part of the funds intended to finance committee
meetings in the early 1980s. In the following years Parliament
was guaranteed information rights through inter-insti-
tutional agreements.7
With the 1999 Comitology Decision, the ‘under-
ground work’ of the committees became more trans-
parent and open to supervision on a legally-binding
basis. Article 7(3) of the Comitology Decision entitles
Parliament in the areas governed by co-decision to
receive all the documents related to each committee
meeting at the same time as the Member State
delegations.8 A bilateral agreement on procedures for
implementing the Decision9 provides for practical
arrangements on document transmission to the EP.10
However, Parlia-
ment’s right to control
the Commission in the
exercise of the powers
delegated to it has still
not been extended, even
though the introduction
of codecision has meant
that Parliament became
a full co-legislator on an
equal footing with the
Council in the adoption
of essential elements,
including the empower-
ing provision for the Commission’s implementing tasks, in
the basic acts. Through the participation of Member States’
delegations in the committees, the Council exercises direct
influence and control in the process of drafting and adopting
an implementing measure. In the management and the
regulatory procedure, in the absence of approval by the
committee, the Council may even adopt the implementing
act itself.
The Parliament does not have the same powers.11 It has
the right to be informed on a regular basis about all
committee proceedings, and an “ultra vires Council
information right” only under the regulatory procedure.
Under Article 5, the Commission is required to submit a
proposal of the implementing measures to the Council and
to inform Parliament if a regulatory committee has given a
non-favourable opinion or no opinion. In this case Parliament
shall inform the Council if it considers that the Commission
exceeded its powers when submitting a proposal.12
Parliament can exercise this right in addition to its right
under Article 8, exercised in an earlier stage of the
implementing rulemaking process, to indicate if it considers
that the Commission has exceeded the implementing
powers provided for in a basic instrument adopted by
codecision.
2. General Observations on Parliament’s Right
of Scrutiny
Implementing Powers and the Need for
Parliamentary Control
Judgements as to whether a Commission implementing act
remains within the powers formally delegated in the basic
act can only be made by distinguishing between matters of
a legislative and implementing nature. In so far as the
content of delegated legislation is pre-defined and
determined by the parent act, no problems should arise
because the executive legislator (the Commission) has to
act within the political will of the democratically-elected
legislators (i.e. the Council and EP). But it is difficult or even
impossible to assess the extent of the permissible delegation
of law-making without some sort of substantive hierarchy
of norms, established and assessed by legal acts and not
only by formal criteria.
Contrary to most national Constitutions, the Community
Treaty does not give any indications of what has to be
regulated by the legislator(s) following legislative procedures
and what can be delegated to the Commission. Article 211
only stipulates that ‘implementing powers’ shall be conferred
on the Commission. The European Court of Justice (ECJ)
has not defined the implementing powers, but what was to
be regulated at legis-
lative level: namely ‘the
essential elements’.13
On the basis of case
law, it can be concluded
that the concept of
implementation is gene-
rally given a wide inter-
pretation, especially in
the field of agriculture.14
It is not only the wor-
ding of the enabling
provision that one has
to look at, but the whole
system of the relevant market, the regulated issue in
question when assessing the scope of empowerment.15
This lack of a general definition of executive and legislative
measures does not make it easy for Parliament to indicate
whether the Commission in a certain case acted within or
beyond the delegated powers. In the end the ECJ is the only
competent institution to decide if the Commission acts
within its duties and powers, possibly at Parliament’s
instigation.
Moreover, Parliament’s own interests are not uniform.
Depending on the procedure to be followed and on what
content is to be considered as non-essential, the EP’s
interest in control is different. As the Parliament itself stated
in its 1984 Report, it is not interested in regulating or calling
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concerns regarding the
lack of transparency of
those committees and the
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back issues on mere technicalities: ‘The technical adaptation
committee system is contrary to the spirit of this provision to
the Treaty system and to the general principle common to
the laws of the Member States that the legislator must not
interfere with the exercise of delegated power.’
Parliament’s right of scrutiny appears to have con-
siderably different implications under each of the three
comitology procedures. Matters dealt with under the
management procedure are normally those with budgetary
implications or of a more technical administrative nature
(such as research, education and cultural programmes)
with less leeway for the Commission. They are therefore
generally of less interest to Parliament for control purposes.
Another reason why Parliament might not even have an
interest in having the ‘ultra vires Council information right’
under Article 5 for drafts submitted to a management
committee, is that most of the measures regulated under
this procedure are agricultural matters for which basic acts
are not adopted under Article 251 and Parliament does not
have the same rights anyway.
Article 8 of the Comitology Decision
’If the European Parliament indicates, in a Resolution
setting out the grounds on which it is based, that draft
implementing measures, the adoption of which is
contemplated and which have been submitted to a
committee pursuant to a basic instrument adopted
under Article 251 of the Treaty, would exceed the
implementing powers provided for in the basic
instrument, the Commission shall re-examine the draft
measures. Taking the Resolution into account and
within the time-limits of the procedure under way the
Commission may submit a new draft measure to the
committee, continue with the procedure or submit a
proposal to the European Parliament and the Council
on the basis of the Treaty (…).’
A Resolution based on Article 8 is in no way legally binding
for the Commission, but it does have a legal effect insofar as
it requires the Commission at least to re-examine the draft
measure, taking the resolution into account. Whatever effect
this ‘taking into account might ultimately have, after the
Commission informs Parliament of the action it intends to
take thereon, the Commission can continue with the procedure
as if Parliament had not expressed its opinion at all.
The inter-institutional agreement implementing the
Comitology Decision16 lays down a period of one month for
Parliament in which the plenary has to adopt such a
resolution, beginning on the date of receipt of the final draft
of the implementing measure. The draft implementing
measures are first presented at the committee meeting and,
if they are substantially modified during the meeting, are
resubmitted later.17
Rule 81 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure18
Rule 81 – Implementing provisions
1. When the Commission forwards a draft implementing
measure to Parliament, the President shall refer the
document in question to the committee responsible
for the act from which the implementing provisions
derive.
2. On a proposal from the committee responsible,
Parliament may, within one month – or three months
for financial services measures – of the date of
receipt of the draft implementing measure, adopt a
resolution objecting to the draft measure, in particular
if it exceeds the implementing powers provided for
in the basic instrument. Where there is no part-
session before the deadline expires, or in cases
where urgent action is required, the right of response
shall be deemed to have been delegated to the
committee responsible. This shall take the form of a
letter from the committee chairman to the Member
of the Commission responsible, and shall be brought
to the attention of all Members of Parliament. If
Parliament objects to the measure, the President
shall request the Commission to withdraw or amend
the measure or submit a proposal under the
appropriate legislative procedure.
Simultaneously with the introduction of the ultra vires right
in the second Comitology Decision, Parliament reworded
the rule on implementing provisions in its own Rules of
Procedure in June 1999. In contrast with the Comitology
Decision, Rule 81 provides for an objection to draft
implementing measures also on grounds other than the
Commission’s exceeding its implementing powers. Before
May 2004 the EP’s rules of procedure did not mention any
aspects at all of the Commission’s executive powers to
which Parliament should or could object. Parliament wanted
to be free to object on any grounds and for any reasons
whatever, formally as well as substantively. Therefore
Parliament adopted a Resolution19 explaining that it will not
refrain from objecting to the Commission’s (draft)
implementing measures based on Rule 88 (now Rule 81)
because of the newly acquired ultra vires right introduced
in the Comitology Decision. This Resolution is annexed to
the inter-institutional agreement dealing with Parliament’s
information and scrutiny right given by the Comitology
Decision: ‘this agreement is without prejudice to its right to
adopt any resolution on any subject, notably when it objects
to the contents  of a draft implementing measure; this
agreement is also without prejudice to its right to object to
implementing measures referred to the Council following
an unsuccessful committee procedure pursuant to Rule 88
of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure’ (emphasis added).
Obviously, such a Resolution based only on Parliament’s
internal rules of procedure does not entail any obligation
for the Commission, not even an obligation to re-examine
the draft measure in the light of the Resolution. It is a simple
political statement requesting the Commission to react in a
certain way but without having any legally binding effect
whatsoever. Conversely, this does as will be seen of course
not prevent the Commission from actually sharing
Parliament’s opinion.
3. Parliament’s Exercise of its Right of Scrutiny:
the three Resolutions
Since the 1999 Comitology Decision, Parliament has
adopted three Resolutions based on Article 8 of the
Comitology Decision and/or Rule 81 of its rules of procedure
with regard to three different draft implementing measures
proposed by the Commission:
– Safe harbour privacy principles in 2000
– Cosmetics tested on animals in 2002
– Passenger name records (PNR) in 2004
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a) Safe harbour privacy principles
The basic act and the Commission’s powers
The EU data protection Directive20 protects the rights of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and ensures the free movement of personal data without
restriction within the EU. Article 25 of this Directive stipulates
that the transfer of data outside the EU is only allowable if
an adequate level of data protection is secured in the
recipient country. Article 25(6) empowers the Commission,
following a management procedure, to lay down in a
Decision that a third country actually does ensure an
adequate level of protection. On the basis of this article, the
Commission adopted its Safe Harbour Decision21 setting
out a number of principles with which US organisations
must comply if they want to receive personal data from the
EU. The Commission confirms an adequate level of
protection for personal data transferred from the Community
to organisations in the US as long as these so-called ‘safe
harbour’ principles are fulfilled.
The EP Resolution22
Pursuant to Article 8 of the Comitology Decision and its own
Rules of Procedure, Parliament used its power of scrutiny for
the first time in its Safe Harbour Resolution in July 2000. In
this Resolution, Parliament contests the adequacy of the
level of protection given to personal data in the US, even if
the safe harbour privacy principles are implemented by the
receiving US organisation. It points out that ‘such principles
and the relevant explanations’ could be considered adequate
protection only if substantive changes are made. Parliament
in particular proposes changes concerning the lack of an
individual’s right of appeal and compensation for the loss
sustained through a violation of the safe harbour principles.
With regard to the Commission’s powers, Parliament
merely states that it is within the Commission’s competence
to ‘ensure, on behalf of the citizens of the Union and its
Member States that “adequate” protection exists in third
countries’. Even though Parliament bases its Resolution on
its Rules of Procedure as well as on Article 8 of the Council
Comitology Decision, nowhere does the Resolution actually
mention that the Commission would act ultra vires by
adopting the Safe Harbour Decision. Nor does Parliament
refer to any of the possible requests anticipated – to
withdraw, amend or submit a legislative proposal. It calls
on the Commission to ’closely monitor the operation of the
safe harbour system’. Parliament in the end asks for
implementation of the Decision without making any
amendments or making this conditional on introduction of
the proposed changes.
The Commission: ‘taking into account’
The Commission adopted the Safe Harbour Decision on 26
July 2000 despite Parliament’s objections. It was a year
later that the Commission introduced Recital 12 justifying
its position in the light of Parliament’s resolution:23
‘The Commission re-examined the draft decision in the
light of that resolution and concluded that, although the
European Parliament expressed the view that certain
improvements needed to be made to the save harbour
principles and related FAQs before it could be considered
to provide adequate protection, it did not establish that
the Commission would exceed its powers in adopting
the decision.’
Analysis and criticism
In its first ultra vires resolution, Parliament in a rather
incoherent way expresses concerns, gives its opinion and
proposes changes to the substance of a decision the
implementation of which it calls on the Commission to
monitor closely. It does not actually indicate that the
Commission would exceed its powers by adopting its
implementing measure. Even if one argues that the
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T T T T Table 1 able 1 able 1 able 1 able 1
Comparison of Article 8 of the Comitology Decision and R Comparison of Article 8 of the Comitology Decision and R Comparison of Article 8 of the Comitology Decision and R Comparison of Article 8 of the Comitology Decision and R Comparison of Article 8 of the Comitology Decision and Rule 81 of the EP ule 81 of the EP ule 81 of the EP ule 81 of the EP ule 81 of the EP’s R ’s R ’s R ’s R ’s Rules of P ules of P ules of P ules of P ules of Procedure rocedure rocedure rocedure rocedure
Article 8 of the Comitology Decision Rule 81 of the EP’s rules of procedure
scope of application draft implementing measures all draft implementing measures
submitted pursuant to a basic act
adopted under codecision
timeframe within 1 month after submission of the whenever: it is in the EP’s own
final draft measure to the EP: only then interest to adopt it as soon as
is the Commission allowed to adopt the possible without prejudice to
implementing measure the time of adoption of the
implementing measure
content “ultra vires indication”: general objection to the draft
the Commission exceeding its implementing measure, including
implementing powers, as provided for content
in the basic act
effect Commission has to re-examine the draft request to the Commission, no
measure “taking the Resolution into legally binding effect
account” and inform Parliament
accordingly
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Resolution is at variance with the draft, Parliament definitely
does not raise any objections to an ultra vires action within
the meaning of Article 8 of the Comitology Decision.
One could argue that Parliament itself acted ultra vires
by not limiting its objections to the question of whether the
Commission acted ultra vires. Following this position, the
Commission could have argued that this Resolution is not
to be considered to be such under Article 8 of the Comitology
Decision, but only under Rule 81, thereby stating that it
does not result in an obligation of the Commission to re-
examine the draft measure.
Nevertheless some arguments could be found to suggest
that the Commission did actually exceed its powers under
the basic act: Article 25(6) of the Data Protection Directive
only empowers the Commission to find that a third country
ensures an adequate level of protection within the meaning
of Article 25(2). It could be argued that, by confirming that
the US provided an adequate level of protection, the
Commission did not adhere to the assessment criteria as
provided for in this Paragraph (2) and thereby exceeded its
competences. This argument holds water especially as
Paragraph 2 refers to the rules of law in force in the third
country, whereas the safe harbour principles are not law
but only non-binding principles with which US companies
must comply if they want to receive data. Parliament
actually addresses this problem in its Resolution on PNR
(see below) where it indicates that the Commission might
exceed its competences as regards substance because it
declared rules, which had not been proven to be binding,
adequate under Article 25(6) of the Data Protection Directive.
The Commission subsequently fulfilled its obligations
under Parliament’s resolution and more, by introducing
Recital 12 in its Safe Harbour Directive. As the Commission
is not called upon to give a statement to explain the extent
to which it has taken account of Parliament’s resolution and
as the inter-institutional agreement only obliges the
Commission to inform Parliament beforehand of what it
intends to do (i.e. submit a new draft, continue the procedure
or submit a legislative proposal), the reason for amending
the legislative act by including Recital 12 almost a year after
adopting it can hardly have been a legal one. Nor can the
issue of transparency explain the Commission’s action. The
added value and interpretative guideline of this recital is
thus rather questionable.
b) Cosmetics tested on animals
The basic act and the Commission’s powers
The Council Directive relating to the marketing and sale of
cosmetic products24 provided for a ban on the marketing of
cosmetics containing ingredients tested on animals. The
original date for entry into force of this ban was 1 January
1998, but the Commission was empowered to postpone
the date of implementation for the Member States ‘if there
has been insufficient progress in developing satisfactory
methods to replace animal testing (…)’. Pursuant to this
provision, the Commission, following a regulatory
procedure, adopted Directive 97/1825 and replaced the
date of the ban in the basic act until after 30 June 2000. In
this implementing Directive the Commission also
empowered itself again to postpone the date of entering
into force of the ban.26
In spring 2000 the Commission presented two different
legislative instruments to amend the Council Directive. On
the one hand, it came up with a legislative proposal27 to
amend the Council Directive in order to solve once and for
all the issue of experiments on animals in the cosmetics
sector. On the other hand, the Commission exercised its
implementing powers to amend the basic Directive by
postponing the ban for a second and, as it said, the last time
to 30 June 2002.28 The reason for postponing the ban for
only two more years was that the Commission expected
alternative testing methods to become available within that
period and the amended basic Directive to be adopted by
then. However, the amendment of the Cosmetics Directive
proved to be more difficult than the Commission had
anticipated: Council and Parliament could not agree on a
new regulation for animal tests for cosmetic products until
30 June 2002 thus allowing the ban on the marketing of
animal tested cosmetics to enter into force.
After the legislative proposal had already been dealt
with by the Conciliation Committee, the Commission
presented a new draft implementing measure in September
with the intention of again postponing the ban retroactively
from 1 July 2002 until 31 December 2002. The latter date
was defended by the Commission on the grounds that this
implementing measure should only provide for an interim
period until the Conciliation Committee came to agree on
the amendment of the basic Directive.29
The EP Resolution30
In its Resolution on the postponement of the ban, Parliament
states that regardless of the legality of the second ‘self-
empowerment’, the Commission had now in any case
exceeded its powers by postponing the date of entering into
force of the ban for a third time. Parliament argues that the
Commission itself explicitly stated in Recital 10 of its
implementing Directive that it would postpone the ban for
the last time. It therefore holds the view that the Commission
exhausted the implementing powers conferred on it by
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Nevertheless some arguments could be found to
suggest that the Commission did actually exceed its
powers under the basic act: Article 25(6) of the Data
Protection Directive only empowers the Commission to
find that a third country ensures an adequate level of
protection within the meaning of Article 25(2).
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adopting the second postponement. Furthermore it points
out that any postponement would now be retroactive as the
ban had already entered into force. Parliament therefore
called on the Commission to withdraw its draft implementing
Decision and on the Member States not to vote in favour of
the draft measure in the regulatory committee.
The Commission: ‘taking into account’
The Commission was under no obligation to react at all
to this resolution, not even to re-examine the draft measure
or to address the Parliament with a formal answer as would
be the case for a Resolution adopted pursuant to the
Comitology Decision. However the Resolution was taken
into account in its substance: The Commission in the end
did not adopt its draft implementing measure providing for
a third postponement of the ban. After the negative echo
from the Parliament, the draft measure was discussed at the
Committee meeting on the 30 September 2000. At this
meeting no formal opi-
nion was delivered nor
voted on and the treat-
ment of the draft mea-
sure was postponed.31
At that time, the amend-
ment of the basic act in
the legislative procedure
with the same aim to
regulate the testing of
cosmetic products was
already discussed in the
Conciliation Committee.
A compromise could be
found and a joint text
could be agreed on in
the Conciliation Com-
mittee in December
2002 and the newly
amended Council
Directive on animal tests
entered into force in
February 200332  so that
the adoption of an im-
plementing act became
superfluous anyway.
In the Comitology Report for the year 200233 this
Resolution is not mentioned in the horizontal part under the
heading “EP’s right of scrutiny” as would be the case if the
Resolution was to be considered such pursuant to the
Comitology Decision. Although it is mentioned in the
Reports Annex, being considered worthy of mention as an
individual file of institutional importance.
Analysis and criticism
This is the only Resolution to date which states clearly,
simply and without objecting to the political content of the
draft implementing measure, that the Commission exceeded
its powers under the basic act. Yet it is also the one which
actually does NOT refer to Article 8 of the Comitology
Decision, but only to Rule 81 of the Rules of Procedure.
The right of scrutiny only applies to joint acts or acts for
which the last amendment has been adopted under the co-
decision procedure. ‘The Commission’s services are,
however, invited to go beyond this legal obligation and
forward to the Parliament also the draft measures
implementing basic instruments which, although adopted
on different legal basis before the entry into force of the
Maastricht and/or Amsterdam Treaty, would nowadays
come under the co-decision procedure. This was precisely
the case with the Animal Testing Directive.’34 The Cosmetics
Directive was originally adopted under the consultation
procedure. The 6th amendment35 before the draft
implementing measure had been adopted under the co-
operation procedure. It was actually only the most recent
amendment (the 7th) that has been adopted pursuant to
Article 95 of the EC Treaty and thus under the co-decision
procedure. Therefore Parliament could not base its
Resolution on Article 8 but only on its own rules of procedure.
In this special case of proposing an implementing
measure as a ‘quick-fix short-term solution’ for having an
interim regulation until the Conciliation Committee found
a compromise on the adoption of the legislative proposal
to amend the same basic act on which the implementing
measure is based,36 it is questionable whether it was
necessary for the
Commission to present
an implementing act,
even only for an interim
period, as the issue was
in the hands of the legis-
lators anyway. The fact
that the Commission still
proposed an imple-
menting measure after
the time of empower-
ment might be seen as
an attempt to see
whether Parliament
would finally tolerate this
third postponement –
obviously without any
legal basis – only for this
interim period. The fact
that Parliament adopted
a resolution even though
it was not legally binding
at all, showed the Com-
mission that Parliament
takes the issue really
‘seriously’ and it might
be seen as an ’early warning’ of further and more rigorous
legal action to be taken. As will be seen, Parliament did
actually do so in the case of PNR by bringing an action for
annulment.
c) Passenger Name Records (PNR)
The basic act and the Commission’s powers
The third Commission implementing act which prompted
Parliament to adopt an ultra vires Resolution was again
based on the Data Protection Directive. The adoption of
Commission Decision on PNR37  in May 2004 is a response
to the unilateral US decision on Aviation and Transportation
Security adopted in the aftermath of the events of 11
September 2001. This US decision requires airline com-
panies to provide certain public US institutions with direct
access to or transfer of data concerning passengers and
crew flying to, from or in the US. As these US requirements
potentially conflict with Community and Member State
legislation on data protection, especially the EC Data
Protection Directive, the EU tried to agree on a compromise
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though it was not legally
binding at all, showed the
Commission that Parliament
takes the issue really 'seriously'
and it might be seen as an
’early warning’ of further
and more rigorous legal
action to be taken.
The Parliament did actually
bring an action for annulment.
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solution with the US in finding a balance between the
citizens’ (fundamental) right38 of privacy and the need to
exchange personal data in order to fight terrorism. After
some commitments or ’undertakings’ made by the US, the
Commission finally gave the ‘green light’ to the transfer of
PNR files of European citizens to US public authorities by
indicating that the data on air passengers transferred to the
US authorities would enjoy the ‘adequate protection’
required under the EU’s Data Protection Directive (=
‘adequacy finding’).
The Commission adopted this implementing Decision
using the powers given to it under Article 25(6) of the
Council Data Protection Directive. The safe harbour principle
did not apply to the transfer of data regarding European
airline passengers to US public institutions because such
data is only available to companies under the jurisdiction
of certain public bodies that control the fairness of
commercial practices. As European airlines do not fall
under the jurisdiction of such US bodies, a special adequacy
finding decision for PNR had to be adopted.39 Furthermore
the Commission decided that it was also necessary to have
an international agreement, as an implementing act based
on Article 25 of the Data Protection Directive would not
allow for a comprehensive and full regulation of the matter.
For that reason a bilateral international agreement between
the EU and the US complements the ‘adequacy finding’
decision and deals with certain legal problems not addressed
by the latter.40 The Council authorised the Commission to
negotiate such an agreement which was then adopted by
the Council in accordance with Article 300(3) of the
Community Treaty.41 This Article regulates the procedure
for adopting international agreements and generally
provides only for consultation with Parliament. Derogating
from this principle, Article 300(3) provides for the assent of
Parliament if, for example, an international agreement
entails the amendment of a basic act adopted under the
codecision procedure. The Council based both its instruments
– the decision to conclude an international agreement as
well as the Data Protection Directive itself – on Article 95,
the legal basis for Internal Market instruments.42
The EP Resolution43
In its Resolution adopted on 31 March 2004 Parliament
opposed this Commission draft measure.44 On the one
hand Parliament argues that the Commission was acting
without a legal basis permitting the use of PNR commercial
data for public purposes, and states on the other hand that
the level of data protection in the US is not adequate.
With regard to the first argument, Parliament holds that
[at this stage] there is no legal basis in the EU permitting the
use of PNR commercial data for public-security purposes.
It expressly underlines the Member States competence for
protecting individuals as regards PNR data as long as the
Union does not act. As regards substance, Parliament
considers the Commission to have exceeded the executive
powers conferred on it because of the non-binding nature
of the undertakings made by the US. Parliament does not
expressly complain that the Commission is exceeding its
implementing powers given to it by Article 25 of the Data
Protection Directive. What it states is that the draft decision
is a measure merely designed to implement the Data
Protection Directive and as such it may not result in a
lowering of the data protection standards. Parliament held
back from determining whether the draft decision actually
is of such nature; it only states that ‘its effect, however might
be a lowering.’
Referring to one of the possibilities provided for in Article
8 of the Comitology Decision, Parliament calls on the
Commission to withdraw the draft decision. Without referring
to the existing international agreement which was ultimately
adopted, Parliament calls on the Commission to provide
for an international agreement in compliance with the
fundamental rights and some of the principles stipulated by
Parliament. Parliament considered that, if such an agreement
were to be adopted, the Commission could legitimately
submit a new adequacy-finding decision. Furthermore
Parliament reserved the right to take the matter to the Court
of Justice if the Commission went ahead.
The Commission: ‘taking into account’
The Commission Decision entered into force despite
Parliament’s Resolution, as did the international agreement,
despite Parliament’s request for the Court’s opinion. The
Commission thereby considered ‘that adoption of the
decision and consequent signing of the agreement with the
US was for passengers and for the protection of their data
much better than leaving the question in a complete legal
void which was the only alternative. The Commission
satisfied the requirement to inform Parliament on what it
intended to do by providing oral explanations on 29 March
and 19 April by Commissioner Bolkenstein as regards the
Commission’s draft decision. Written explanations were
further given in a letter from President Prodi to President
Cox.’45
Analysis and criticism
In this Resolution, Parliament clearly expresses objections
and gives reasons why the Commission exceeded its
implementing powers with regard to the formal basis and
substance of the Commission’s draft decision. By saying
that – at this stage – there is no legal basis in the EU for
permitting the use of PNR commercial data for public-
security purposes, Parliament indirectly rejects the Data
Protection Directive as a legitimate legal basis for adopting
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the PNR Decision. On the other hand, by calling on the
Commission to submit to Parliament a new adequacy-
finding decision, Parliament in fact asks for a new
implementing act (based on the Data Protection Directive)
adopted in combination with a sound international
agreement.
Parliament does not give a comprehensive explanation
as to why it considers the fact that the draft decision, which
is based on ‘undertakings the binding nature of which is far
from proven,’ makes the PNR Decision an ultra vires act. It
most likely addresses the fact that Article 25(2) of the Data
Protection Directive empowers the Commission to assess
the adequacy of the level of protection in the third country,
particularly in the light of the ‘rules of law in force’. This
would be an argument that Parliament could have brought
forward previously when adopting the safe harbour
resolution, as those principles are also of a non-binding
nature (see above).
Even though an international agreement was already
part of the legal framework regulating the transfer of PNR,
and although Parliament asked for a new adequacy finding,
thereby acknowledging that the Data Protection Directive
could serve as a legal basis, it took the matter to Court. On
25 June 2004 Parliament decided to bring in an action for
annulment under Article 230 of the Community Treaty for
both the Commission Decision on PNR and the Council
Decision which concluded the international agreement.46
The question of whether Parliament should have been
asked for its assent under Article 300(3) in view of the
international agreement amending the Data Protection
Directive is different, but of course related to the question
of whether the Commission exceeded its competences
given by this Council Directive. Assuming that the
Commission was basically empowered to adopt the PNR
agreement on the basis of Article 25 of the Data Protection
Directive, Parliament seems to indicate that the Commission
exceeded this empower-
ment by toning the basic
act down. Generally the
Commission is only em-
powered to legislate with-
in the general principles
and aims as provided for
in the basic act. With
regard to interference with
fundamental rights of
privacy in this case, the
Court has decided in a
case about agricultural
subsidies that such inter-
ference does not necessarily have to be regarded as an
‘essential element’ and can therefore be dealt with at
implementing level even if not explicitly provided for in the
basic act.47
4. Conclusions
Comparing the Parliament’s ultra vires control given to it by
the Comitology Decision with the possibility of adopting a
Resolution on implementing acts under its own rules of
procedure, we conclude that there is no crucial difference
in the end. Both can be seen as a mere ’institutionalised
threat’ to bring an action for annulment. Also a Resolution
adopted under the Comitology Decision does not prevent
the Commission from going ahead, nor does it enhance the
democratic legitimacy of delegated rulemaking.
On the basis of the three individual analyses, moreover,
we argue that this ultra vires control is actually not designed
so that it can be used effectively. It conflicts with Parliament’s
political nature, while the current implementing system at
European level does not allow for effective scrutiny. The
main problem is the lack of a systematic distinction between
implementing acts with a possible political impact and
those of a mere executive nature. For the latter, the right of
scrutiny as it stands, with only an ex post juridical control,
should be enough.
Moreover, since Parliament has locus standi as a fully
privileged actor under the Article 230 procedure, and can
thus bring an action not only to defend its own prerogatives
but also in the name of the citizens, judicial review can be
regarded sufficient for mere technical measures. For
Commission acts adopted under ’political discretionary
power’, however, a new way of parliamentarian control
and a system of cooperation and coordination with the
Council has to be found.
Ultra vires control and democratic legitimacy
In a system of division of powers, the legislative is normally
called on to exercise its political control over the executive.
Parliamentarian control usually means political control, but
Article 8 of the Comitology Decision provides for legal
control. It is designed to make the Commission aware that
it is exceeding its powers in the adoption of a particular
implementing act, but the EP, reflecting its political nature,
has used it as a medium to make political statements.
Parliament was not satisfied with the Commission’s ‘policy’
content in the case of the data protection decisions and
therefore adopted a Resolution. In both cases, the PNR and
the Safe Harbour Decision, Parliament took the view that
the rights of citizens to
data protection and pri-
vacy were not sufficiently
protected in the political
issue of finding a balance
between the fight against
terrorism and the protec-
tion of peoples right’s to
confidentiality.
The mere giving of an
opinion by Parliament in
the exercise of Article 8 is
not sufficient to enhance
democratic legitimacy of
the comitology system. Some would say that it does not give
any additional value at all, since the Parliament already
had the right to bring an action of annulment under Article
230. Yet, this right of ultra vires scrutiny, exercised correctly,
could give Parliament quite a strong legal say in the early
stage of drafting the Commission’s implementing measures.
As seen in the Resolution on the ban on animal testing, the
use of Article 8 as an ‘institutionalized threat’ to bring an
action for annulment may make the ultra vires right, which
in itself is powerless, a quite effective right legally.
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Parliament’s internal organisation and the
processing of implementing drafts
Nowadays Parliament does receive all the documents required
to exercise its control over the comitology system as established
by the Comitology Decision and the related inter-institutional
agreements. Yet the internal organisation of Parliament as
a political institution is hardly compatible with the legal-
administrative comitology system. Parliament cannot properly
control the comitology procedures because of internal
difficulties in processing and assessing all the information
received. Before adopting a resolution in plenary, as Par-
liament is required to do at the latest one month after
receiving the final draft implementing measure, all the EP
committees directly and indirectly involved in the domain
should give their opinion on it. It might even happen that the
decision in plenary has to
be taken within a few day
as the EP normally only
has one plenary session a
month. Parliament is sim-
ply overloaded.
Another reason for
Parliament’s incapacity to
exercise its right of scrutiny
properly might be found
in the lack of a homoge-
nous party system at Euro-
pean level. At national
level, information about
‘hot issues’ at admini-
strative level are passed
on via the political parties,
thereby giving the overruled opposition the chance to bring
the discussion to Parliament. At European level the political
parties have different ‘souls’ and the interpretation of an
issue quite often differs according to the internal national
positions.
Distinction between the technical and political
impact of implementing measures
Under the current system, there is no distinction between
technical delegated acts and those with a possible political
impact. Parliament cannot effectively apply ultra vires
scrutiny under the current system on the one hand due to
inter- and intra-institutional organisations but also because
of a lack of any sort of institutionalised warning system to
indicate which acts might possibly have a political impact
and which ones merely change proportions of certain
ingredients due to technical progress. At the moment it is
either the legislators regulating themselves or delegating to
the Commission under the Comitology procedures under
which Parliament cannot legally influence or review the
measure at all and also Council can only get heed of the
measure again with quite some difficulty.
For simple technical measures a merely formal legal
scrutiny can be considered sufficient in a working system of
overall checks and balances being democratically
accountable via judicial review anyway. But for political
implementing measures, measures of legislative discretion
a necessity of a legitimising democratic supervision – while
deciding control – has to be developed.
This distinction between mere execution and (political)
rulemaking at implementing level can, of course, never be
a sharp and clear one ex ante. But the best possible
distinction seems to be better than none at all. This guaran-
tees effective political supervision in delicate delegated fields
and a fast and adequate implementation in technical dele-
gated fields using comitology as a mainly advisory procedu-
re (as proposed in the new Commission proposal).
Two proposals are currently on the table which would
change the present situation.
The Commission’s Proposal
The Commission has presented a Proposal48 to modify
Council Decision 1999/468/CE under which Parliament
would be given full equality with the Council in the supervision
of measures to implement acts adopted by codecision.
However, in this proposal both supervisory bodies can
ultimately be overridden
by the Commission. Thus
even though Parliament
is placed on an equal
footing with the Council,
both of them are ‘placed
down’ to the current par-
liamentary level. Article 8
would be deleted, so that
no parliamentary super-
vision for acts adopted
under the advisory pro-
cedure would apply at all.
There would no longer be
a difference between the
advisory and the regula-
tory procedure with
regard to the Commission’s possibility to adopt the act in
the end, even against the opinion of the Committee and
objections by Council and Parliament. The added value of
the regulatory procedure would be to serve as a bargaining
forum, allowing the legislators to give their (political)
opinions. The Commission is thereby made aware of the
opposing views, legally and politically, and is given the
option of adapting its position to avoid subsequent claims
and litigation under Article 230.
This approach is perfectly coherent with the notion of a
separation of powers, inasmuch as the legislative power
should not participate in but only supervise executive
rulemaking, and the Commission has responsibility for the
execution of EC laws. The tenuous supervision granted to
the legislators would also be democratically and politically
acceptable as long as only executive tasks are delegated
and do not entail any political impact, thus guaranteeing
the predictability and accountability of the executive (the
principle of legality). In this perspective, indeed, it would
appear that the ‘problem’ of the current 1999 Decision is
not so much that Parliament is granted too few supervisory
powers but that the Council is granted excessive participation
in the adoption of merely technical implementing acts.
Implementing Acts under the Treaty establishing
a Constitution for Europe
The Constitutional Treaty introduces an explicit distinction
between legislative and non-legislative acts, even though
this is not entirely clear. On the one hand, these are to be
distinguished by the nature of the procedures by which they
are adopted: legislative acts are in principle adopted by the
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Parliament and Council on the basis of a Commission
proposal, whereas non-legislative acts are adopted either
as delegated regulations (mainly by the Commission),
implementing acts (mainly by the Commission at European
level) or specific cases (mainly by the Council). On the other
hand, they are distinguished in terms of the instruments
involved: legislative acts will be European laws or framework
laws; non-legislative acts will take the form of European
Regulations and Decisions. These new Regulations,
moreover, can either be directly applicable or require
transposition into national measures (and thus have the
legal form of either the present Regulations or Directives).
Despite these complications, however, a new and
potentially very valuable distinction concerning the future of
comitology is proposed. On the one hand, Article I-36
provides that ‘European laws and framework laws may
delegate to the Commission the power to adopt delegated
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European regulations to supplement or amend certain
non-essential elements of the law or framework law’. The
conditions to be laid down in the future for this form of
delegation suggest an equality between the Parliament and
the Council, either of which may ‘decide to revoke the
delegation’ and have the right to state a binding objection
to the proposed delegated regulation. On the other hand,
Article I-37 stipulates that ‘implementing acts’ may be
adopted at European level where uniformity is required. In
these cases ‘mechanisms for control by Member States’ will
be agreed.
If this new classification helps to distinguish ‘delegated
legislation’ with political impact from ‘delegated execution’
regulating technical issues, this could make it possible to
improve the balance in rule-making for implementation
between democratic accountability, on the one hand, and
effectiveness in terms of flexibility, on the other.
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why the Commission in the Corrigendum states that Parlia-
ment’s Resolution has not yet been published in the OJ.
24 Directive 76/768/EEC on the approximation of laws of the
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27-29 June 2005, Maastricht or Brussels
Seminar: How Can Member States Efficiently Influence
Community Decision-Making: A Practical Guide for
Preparing a Winning Strategy
0510801 € 850
26-28 September 2005, Milan
L’Unione Europea: Le Istituzioni e I meccanismi decisionali
0510601 € 650
17-18 October 2005, Maastricht
Advanced Seminar on Comitology
0510004 € 700
22-23 November 2005, Maastricht
Seminar: Comitology in the Area of Financial Services
0510005 € 700
For further information and registration forms, please contact:
Mrs Belinda Vetter,
Tel.: +31 43 3296 382
Fax: +31 43 3296 296
E-mail: b.vetter@eipa-nl.com
Website: http://www.eipa.nl